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CHINA:
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RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Vi et Nam is heavy on the heart of the nation .
Vietnamese war is a tragedy .
lives which i t cla i ms .

The

It is a tragedy in the American

It is a tragedy in the death and devasta-

t i on which, in the name of

salvatio~:\it

has spread throughout

Viet Nam.
My views on United States policy respecting Viet
Nam are no secret .

I have stated them, restated them, and

elaborated them many times.

I have cautioned against an ever-

deepen i ng military i nvolvement i n that conflict .
t o any i ncrease in it today .

I am opposed

I believe that the way out of a

barbarous situation is not to go further into it .
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The first step towards peace, in my judgment, is
to concentrate and consolidate the U. S . military effort and to
escalate the peace-effort, looking towards the negotiation of an
honorable end of the conflict.
That, in brief, is the way I feel about Viet Nam .
That is the way I have felt about it for a long time.
dent knows it .

The Senate knows it .

The Presi-

Montana knows it.

What I have to say to you, today, touches only
indirectly on Viet Nam.

My remarks are intended to go beyond

Viet Nam to what may well be the roots of the war .

In this first

lecture of the series on i nternational affairs, I wish to address
your attention to what is the great void i n the foreign relations
of this nation--to the question of China.
As a nation, we have lived through a generation
in only heresay association with a third of the entire human race.
At the inception of this void, we were engaged in a costly and
i ndecis ive conflict in Korea--on China's northeast frontier.

Two

- 3 decades later, we are engaged once again in a costly and indecisive conflict, this time on China's southeast frontier.

These

two great military involvements on the Chinese periphery are not
unrelated to the absence of relevant contact between China and
the United States.
Sooner or later a tenuous truce may be achieved
in Viet Nam even as a truce was achieved in Korea. · In my judgment, however, there will be no durable peace in Korea, Viet Nam,
or anywhere else in Asia unless there is a c&ndid confrontation
with the problems of the Sino-U. S. relation5hip.
China needs peace if the potentials of its culture
are to be realized.

This

natio~

needs peace for the same reason.

In this uay and age, the world needs peace for civilized survival.
You young people have the greatest stake in peace.

For that

reason, I ask you to look beyond Viet Nam, behind Korea, to what
may well be the core of the failure of peace in Asia--to the
U. S.-Chinese estrangement of two decades.

- 4 In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer of the Declaration
of Independ2nce, sent the f'lrst American clipper ship to trade
with China .

The year that President George Washington took the

oath of office, 1789, fourteen American ships were riding at
ancho r in the Pearl River off Canton in South China .
There are n o American ships in Chinese ports today.
There have not been for almost twenty years.
ha r dly an

America~

In t¥enty years,

doctor, scientist, businessman, journalist,

student, or even a tourist has set foot in China .
Across the Pacific Ocean, we and the Chinese glare
at one anotherj
ously .

u~comprehendingly,

apprehensively, and suspici-

In the United States, there is fear of the sudden march

of Chinese armies into Southeast Asia.

In China, there is fear

of a tighter American encirclement and American nucle ar attack,
We see millions of Chinese soldiers poised on
China ' s frontiers .
way .

We see leaders who threaten in a most violent

We see an internal Chinese turmoil to confirm our fears of
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irrationality and recklessness.

Finally, we see a growing

nuclear power, with the looming spectre of a full-fledged Chinese
intercontinental ballistic missile force .
On the other hand, the Chinese see themselves
surrounded by massive American military power .

They see U. S.

naval, ground, and air bases scattered through Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand.

They see

over half a million American troops in neighboring Viet Nam and
hundreds of thousands more nearby.

They see tremendous nuclear

capability with missiles zeroed in on Chinese cities.
the United States as

11

They see

occupying" the Chinese island of Taiwttn

and supporting a Chinese government "Those declared aim is the
recapture of the mainland .

And they see, too, what they describe

as a growing collusion between the United States and the

So~iet

Uninn, a country which they believe infringes China 1 s borders,
threatens to corrupt the Chinese revolution and exercises an
unwelcome influence throughout Asia .

- 6 We and the Chinese have not always looked at one
another with such baleful mistrust.

The American images of China

have fluctuated and shifted in an almost cyclical way.

There has

been the image of the China of wisdom, intell i gence, industry,
piety, stoicism, and strength.

This is the China of Marco Polo,

Pearl Buck, Charlie Chan,and heroic resistance to the Japanese
during World War II.
On the other hand, there has been the
the China of cruelty, barbarism,

violence,a~d

i~age

of

faceless hordes.

This is the China of drum-head trials, summary executions, Fu
Manchu,and the Boxer Rebellion--the China that is summed up in
the phrase

11

yellow peril . 11
Throughout our history, these two images have

alternated, with first one predominant and then the other.

In

the eighteenth century, we looked up to China as an ancient
civilization--superior in many aspects of technology, culture,
and social order and surrounded by an air of splendid mystery.

- 7 Respect turned to contempt, however, with China's quick defeat by
the British in the Opium War of 1840 .

There followed acts of

humiliation of China such as participation in extra-territorial
treaty rights and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 .
Attitudes shifted again in the early twentieth
century to one of benevolence largely in consequence of the influence of missionaries .

There were more missionaries in China from

the United States than from any other country .

More American

missionaries served in China than anywhere else in the world.

The

Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored
people .
Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in

1937 produced another shift from benevolence to admiration .

At

the end of the Second World War, admi rat ion was displaced by dis appointment and frustration, as the wartime truce between Nationalist and Communist forces collapsed in cataclysmic internal
strife .

This nation became profoundly disenchanted. with China, a

disenchantment which was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility .

- 8 -

The hostility was largely a reaction, of course,
to the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chinese mainland .

We did not interpret this event as a consequence of the

massive difficulties and the vast inner weaknesses of a war-torn
China .

Rathe~

we saw it almost as an affront to this nation .

We

saw it as a treacherous extension of the Soviet steam- roller
policies which had reduced Eastern and Central Europe to subservi ence at the end of World War II .
Then, in 1948, came a

Collli~unist

coup in Czechoslo-

vakia and the Soviet attempt to blockade Berlin.

The triumph of

a Communist government in China followed immediately after these
events in Europe .

The nation was shaken to its fingertips.

Still, the press of events continued relentlessly.
In June 1950, the North Koreans launched a sudden attack on South
Korea .

The Chinese forces intervened in the war in November of

that year.

The Un i ted States was brought into a major military

confrontation in which, for the first time, the Chinese were
enemies and not allies.

- 9 -

After these events, the assumptions of American
policy towards China were revised .

An effort was made to meet

both the concern and outrage respecting China which existed in
this nation and the revolutionary militancy of the new Chinese
regime in Asia .

Policy was cast anew on the premise that the

government on the Chinese mainland was an aggressor which, subject
to directions from Moscow, would use force to impose international
Communism on Asia.

Conversely, it was assumed that if the

endorsement of the free nations were

wit~~eld,

this regime which

was s-aid to be "alien" to the Chinese people - -some sort of overgrown puppet of Moscow--would wither and eventually collapse.
On this basis, recognition was not extended to
Peking.

The official view was that the National

Government,

which had retreated to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak
for all of China.

We cut off all trade with the mainland and

did what could be done to encourage other countries to follow
suit.

In a similar fashion, we led a diplomatic campaign year
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after year against the seating of the Chinese People's Republic
in the United Nations .

We drew an arc of military alliances on

the seaward side of China and undergirded them with the deployment of massive American military power in bases throughout the
Western Pacific .
Much has happened to call into question the assumptions in which these policies towards China have been rooted.

In

the first place, the People ' s Republic has shown itself to be
neither a part of a Communist monolith nor a carbon copy of Soviet
Russia .

The fact is that , of the numerous divisions which have

arisen within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow
and Peking have been the most significant .

They so remain today

although the more rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat
tempered by the war in Viet Nam .
At the same time, the government on the mainland
has not only

s~rvived,

it has provided China with a functioning

leadership.

Under its direction, Chinese society has achieved a

- ll -

degree of economic and scientific progress, apparently sufficient
for survival of an enormous and growing population and sophisticated enough to produce thermo - nuclear explosions .
In the last two years, the so-called Cultural
Revolution in China has rekindled what has been a periodic expectation that the Peking government is on the verge of collapse and
the way is open for a military return to the mainland of the
National Government on Taiwan .

There seems to be little doubt

that the turmoil in China has caused serious disruptions.

What

appears in conflict in the cultural revolution, however, is not
the Peking structure as such but the adequacy of its ideological
content.

That would be a far cry from the kind of popular revul-

sion which might be expected to open the doors to a new regime.
In any event, the worst of the upheavals within
China appear to have ended months ago, without any irreparable
break in the continuity of the government or the operations of
the economy .

It is the height of folly to envision, in the
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present

situatio~,

government by

an occasion for the overthrow of the Peking

ex~ernal

military pressures.

Indeed, what would

be better calculated to end, overnight, the remaining ferment on
the mainland than a plausible threat to the security of China or
an actual attack on Chinese territory?
If the People's Republic, then, is here to stay,
what of the other assumption on which this nation's policy respecting China has long been based?

WhBt of the assumption that the

Chinese government is an expanding and aggressive force?

That

it is restrained from sweeping through Asia because we have electec
to meet its challenge along the 17th Parallel wh]ch divides the
Northern and Southern parts of Viet Nam?
In recent years, the present Chinese government
has not shown any great eagerness to use force to spread its
elsewhere in Asia
ideology/although Chinese armies have been employed in assertion
of the traditional borders of China .

To be sure, China has given

enthusiastic encouragement and has promised to support wars of

- 13 national liberation.

However, China has not participated

directly in these wars and support, when it has been forthcoming,
has been limited and circumspect.
In Viet Nam, for example, there is certainly
Chinese encouragement and aid for the North Vietnamese and the
Viet Cong.

Chinese involvement, however, has beenfar more peri-

pheral than our own.

The enemy soldiers with whom we are compeller

to grapple are all Vietnamese and, in fact, mostly South Vietnamese
At every stage of the war, the assistance we have provided to
South Viet Nam has far exceeded the aid from China and from all
outside sources to the Viet Cong and North Viet Nam--both in terms
of men and materiel .

There is Chinese equipment in South Viet

Nam but there are no Chinese battalions.

Even in North Viet Nam,

Chinese manpower is reported to amount, at most, to one-tenth of
our forces in Viet Nam, and the great bulk of these Chinese are
labor troops, some involved in air-defense but most of them
engaged in repairing bomb darnage to roads, railroads, bridges,
and the like .

- 14 Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalaya n
frontier of India,are often cited as evidence of militant Chinese
Communist aggression .

The fact is, however, that Tibet has been

regarded, for many decades, as falling within China's over - all
boundaries .

Not only the Peking government but also the Chinese

National Government on Taiwan insiststhat Tibet belongs to China.
India also acknowledges such to be the case .

Indeed, American

policy has never recognized Tibet as other than Chinese territory .
In the case of the border war with India in 1962,
the Chinese Communists occupied territories which, again, not
only they, but also the Chinese Nationalists, consider to be
Chinese .

It is not precisely characteristic of a militant

expansionism, moreover, for a government to withdraw its military
forces from a territory which they have invested.
government did so

1962

Yet, the Peking

from parts of India which were occupied in

as well as from North Korea.

- 15 As for indirect aggression through economic means,
China has been able to exert only a limited influence, either
through aid or trade .

In Africa .and, indeed, in Southeast Asia,

where attempts have been made to use trade and aid for political
ends, the results have not been conspicuously successful .

The

fact is that most of China ' s trade today rests on a commercialeconomic base .

It is carried on largely with the non-Communist

countries, including, may I add, many of our closest allies.
In short, to speak of China, today, as aggressively·
expansionist is to respond to Chinese words rather than Chinese
actions.

That is not to say that China will not

of threats t omorrow .

pose all manner

If there are not enough nightmares already)

consider the prospects when China's nuclear capabilities will
have been extensively developed, along with a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile force .
Of course, there is an immens.e potential danger
in China; but there is also an immense potential danger in every

- 16 other powerful nation in a world whi ch has no t yet l earned h ow
to maintain civilized survival in a nuclear age exc ept on the
razor's edge .

Insofar as China is concerned, the fundamental

question for us is not whether it is a danger, real or potent i al .
The fundamental question is whether our present policies act t o
alleviate o r to exacerbate the danger .

Do we forestall the

danger by jousting with the shadows and suspicions of the pa st?
Do we help by a continuance in policies which do little if anything to lift the heavy curtain of mutual ignorance a nd host i lity ?
Like it or not, the present Chinese government is
here to stay .

Like it or not, China is a major power in Asia and

is on the way to becoming a nuclear power.

Is it, therefore, i n

this nation's interest and in the interest

of world peace to put

aside, once and for all, what have been the persistent but futi le
attempts to isolate China?

Is it, therefore, in this nation's

interest and in the interest of world peace to try conscient iously
and consistently to do whatever we can do -- and, admittedl y, it is
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not much- - to reshape the relationship with the Chinese along more
constructive and stable lines?

In short, is it propitious for

this nation to try to do what, in fact, the policies of most of
the other Western democracies have already long since done regar ding their Chinese relationships?
I must say that the cteepening of the conflict in
Viet Nam makes more difficult adjustments in policies respecting
China .

Indeed, the present course of events in Viet Nam almost

insures that there shall be no changes.

It is not easy to con -

template an alleviation with any nation which cheers on those
who are engaged in inflicting casualties on Arrrricans .

Yet, it

may well be that this alleviation is an essential aspect of end ing the war and, hence, American casualties .

That consideration,

alone, it seems to me, makes desirable initiatives towards China
at this time .
There are several obvious areas in which these
initiatives would have relevance .

Discriminatory restriction
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on travel to Ctina, for example, is certainly one of these areas.
The Chinese mey or may not admit Americans to their country, as
they choose.

But it is difficult to understand why our own

government should in any way, shape, or form seek to stand in the
way of the attempts of American citizens to breech the great wall
of estrangement between the two nations .

It is, indeed, ironic

that during the past three years there have been more visits of
Americans to North Viet Nam, a nation with which we are at war,
than to China in the past thirteen years .
On the question of travel, it should be recalled
that the Chinese were the first to suggest in 1956 that American
journalists visit China .

The suggestion was summarily rejected

by the then Secretary of State.

When, later, it was decided to

accept the suggestion, the Chinese had changed their minds.
Since that time, this nation has been more inclined to ease the
travel barriers, on the basis of official agreement for exchanges
of persons, but the Chinese have shown no disposition to enter
into agreements or, for that matter, to admit Americans on any
basis .
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In any event, it seems to me that it is in the
positive interest of this nation to encourage Americans, if they
can gain entry, to travel to China .

May I add, I refer not merely

to the travel of selected journalists, doctors, and other speci alists, as is now the policy, but to the travel of any responsible
American.

In the same fashion, it seems to me most appropriate

to admit Chinese travelers to the United States under the same
conditions that pertain to visitors from other Communist countries .
Trade is nF.other ar@a in which long- standing poli cies respecting China are open to serious question .

Technically,

this country still maintains an embargo on all trade with China .
The basis for this policy is compliance with a voluntary resolution of the United Nations which was adopted at our behest at the
time of the Korean conflict .

It is doubtful that the resolution

ever carried much weight among the trading nations of the world .
In any case, it has long since been forgotten.

Today, the princi -

pal nations in the China trade in rough order of importance are

-
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the United Kingdom, Japan, the Soviet Union, West Germany,
Australia, Canada, Italy, and France.

Of all the great maritime

nations, the United States alone clings to a total trade embargo
with China.

Moreover, we are also the only

nation in the

world which makes an effort to enforce what can best be described
as a kind of secondary boycott of re-exported Chinese products.
These policies have had little visible economic
impact, but they have had the most serious political repercussions.
It is conceivable that, to the Chinese, the policies are something
of an irritant.

To friendly nations, however, they have been a

source of constant friction.

Most serious, their continuance

over the years has injected unnecessary venom into the atmosphere
of U. S.-Chinese relations .
Nor can it be said that the situation in Viet Nam
has compelled the pursuit of the embargo and boycott.

The fact

is that these restrictions were in place before most Americans
ever heard of Viet Nam, and, certainly, long before Americans

-

became involved in the war.

21 -

If the Vietnamese conflict is now

seen as justifi cation for leaving these policies undisturbed,
what is to be said of the existing attitude toward trade with
other Communist countries?
The fact is that the European Communists are pro viding North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong with sophisticated military equipment which, from all reports, exceeds in value the
assistance which comes from China.

On what basis, then, is it

meaningful to permit and even to encourage non-strategic trade
with the European

Co~~unist

countries while holding to a closed-

door pol i cy on trade with China?
served by the distinction?

What constructive purpose is

Any rationalization of relations with

China, it seems to me, will requi re an adjustment of th i s dual
approach .

We need to move in the direction of equal treatment

of all Communist nations in trade matters, whatever that treatment may be.

- 22" -

In any event, problems of travel and trade are
secondary obstacles in the development of a more stable relationship between China and the United States .
more significant difficulties .

There are othe r far

I refer, principally, to the

question of Taiwan and to the war in Viet Nam.
There is no doubt that the Chinese government seeks
in

V~et

Nam a government which is friendly, if not subservient.

Peking has not concealed, moreover, its desire for the withdrawal
of American military power from Southeast Asia .

It does not

follow, however, that the price of peace in Southeast Asia is
either Chinese domination or U. S . military intervention .

That

is a black and white oversimplification of a gray situation. The
fact is that neither Burma on China 1 s border nor Cambodia have
been

11

enslaved 11 by China, despite an association of many years,

despite periodic difficulties with the great state to the north
and despite an absence of U. S . support, aid, or protection.

- .-2 3-

These two nations have managed to survive in a state of detachment from the power rivalries of the region .

Furthermore, China

is a signatory to the settlements which emerged from the Geneva
Conferences of

1954 and 1962 and which contain at least a hope

for a middle way to peace in Indo - China .

So far as I am aware,

the Chinese have not been found in direct or unilateral violation
of these agreements.

It is not impossible that a similar settle-

ment,with Chinese participation, might be reached on Viet Nam.
Indeed, it is to be devoutly hoped that there can
be a solution along these lines.

Unless it is found, there is

a very real danger--as the Korean experience shows -- that the pro longation of war on China's frontiers may well bring about
another U. S. - Chinese armed confrontation.
Perhaps the most important element in the rebuilding of stable rel ations with China is to be found in a solution
of the problem of Taiwan .

It may help to come to grips with this

issue, if it is understood at the outset that the island of

-

Taiwan is Chinese.

24-

That is the position of the National Govern -

ment of the Republic of China.
People's Republic of China.

That is the position of the

For a quarter of a century, this

common Chinese position has been reinforced by the policies and
actions of the United States government.
Since that is the case, I do not believe that a
solution to the Taiwan question is facilitated by its statement
in terms of a two-China policy, as has been suggested in some
quarters in recent years.

The fact is that there is one China

which happens to have been divided into two parts by events which
occurred a long time ago .
peace

betwee~

Key factors in the maintenance of

the separate segments have been the interposition

of U. S. military power in the Taiwan straits, and the strengthening of the Natio11al Government of China by massive injections of
economic and military aid.
This course was followed by the United States for
many reasons, not the least of which was that it made possible

-
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a refuge fo r dedicated allies and associates in the war against
Japan .

Most of all> however, it was followed because to have

permitted the closing of the breech by a military clash of the
two opposing Ch-inese forces would have meant a massive bloodbath
and, in the end, the rekindling of another great war in Asia .
However, the situation has changed in the Western
Pacific .

Taiwan is no longe r abjectly dependent for its survival

on the United States.

Some of the passions of the deep Chinese

political division have cooled with the passing of time .

Another

generation has appeared and new Chinese societies, in effect,
have grown up on both sides of the T1iwan strai t s .
Is there not, then, some better way to confr ont
this problem than threat - and - counte r- threat between island
Chinese and mainland Chinese?

Is there not some better way to

live with this situation than by the armed truce which depends ,
in the last analysis, on the continued presence of the U. S . 7th
Fleet in t he Taiwan Straits?

- 29 The questions cannot be answered until all
involved are prepared to take a fresh look at the situation.

It

seems to me that it might be helpful if there could be, among the
Chinese themselves, an examination of the possibilities of
improving the climate.

As I have already 1.ndicated, the proper

framework for any such consideration would be an acceptance of
the content1.on of both Chinese groups--that there is only one
China and Taiwan is a part of it.

In that context, the questions

at issue have to do with the dichotomous situat1.on as between
mainland and island governments and the possibility of bringing
about constructive changes therein by peaceful means.
There is no cause to be sanguine about the prospects of an approach of this kind.

One can only hope that time

may have helped to ripen the circumstances for settlement.

It

is apparent, for example, that the concept which held the
Chinese government on Taiwan to be the sole hope of China's
redemption has grown less relevant with the years.

For Taiwan,

-

27-

therefore, to remain isolated from the mainland is to court the
risk that the island will be left once again, as it has been on
other occasions, in the backwash of Chinese history.
The removal of the wedge of separ ation, moreover,
would also seem to accord with the interests of the mainland
Chinese government .

It does have a legitimate concer n in the

reassertion of the historic connection of Taiwan and China .

It

does have a concern in ending the hostile division which has
been costly and disruptive both within China and in China ' s
international relationships .
From the point of view of the United States, too,
there is an interest in seeking a less tenuous situation.

Progres ·

in settling the Taiwan question could contribute to a general
relaxation of tensions in the Western Pacific and, conceivably,
even to resolution of the conflict in Viet Nam.

Certainly, it

would make possible a reduction in the enoTmous and costly over all defense burdens which were assumed in Asian waters after Horld
t

r.·

- 28
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War II and which, two decades later, still rest on the shoulders
of this nation .
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the basic
adjustment which is needed in policies respecting China is to
make crystal clear that this gover nment does not anticipate, much
less does it seek, the oveLthrow of the government of the Chinese
mainland.

In addition , there is a need to end the dlscrimination

which consigns China to an infer ior status as among the Communist
countries in this nation ' s policies respecting travel and trade.
Finally, it ought to be made unequivocal that we are prepared at
all times to meet with Chinese r epresentatives--formally or
informally-- in order to consider differences between China and
the United States ove r Viet Nam or any other question of common
concern .
Adjustments of this kind in the policies of the
nation, it seems to me, require above all else a fresh perspective .

We need to see the situat i on in Asia as it is today, no t

-

29-

as it appeared twenty years ago in the Himalayan upheaval of the
Chinese revolution.

We need to see the situation

not through

the fog of an old and stagnant hostility but in the light of the
enduring

interes~s

of the United States in the Western Pacific .

In this context we will

~etter

be able to find

appropriate responses at appropriate times to the specific
problems of the Sino-U . S. relationship, whether they have to do
with U. N. representation or diplomatic recognition or the offshore islands or whatever.

Without prior adjustment in perspec -

tive, however, to seek to deal definitively with these questions
would be, to say the least, an exercise in futility .
I should emphasize before concluding that it is
unlikely that there will be any eager Chinese responses to
initiatives on our part .

Nevertheless, I see nothing to be lost

for this nation in trying to move along the lines which have
been suggested.

Chinese intransigence is no license for American

- -30-" -

intransigence.

Our stake in the situation in the Western Paci!ic

is too large for that sort of infantile indulgence.
I see great relevance in thinking deeply of the
issues which divide China and the United States to see if they
can be recast in new and uncluttered molds.
reason, especially for young people, to

There is every

ex~~ine

most cloaely the

premises of policy regarding China which were enshrined almost
two decades ago .

The fact is that the breakdown i n Chinese-U.S.

relations was one of the great failures of my generation and it
is highly doubtful that its full repair shall be seen in my lifetime.

The problem, the refore, will fall largely to you.

It is

not a particularly happy inheritance, but there is reason to hope
that it may fare better in your hands.
Unlike my generation, you know more about Asia .
You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation
and to the world.

In 1942, four months after Pearl Harbor, for

example, an opinion poll found that sixty percent of a nat ional

31 -

sample of

America~s

still could not locate either China or India

on an outline map of the world.
case today .

Certainly that would not be the

Furthermore, you have not had the experience of

national trauma

in moving abruptly fyom an era marked by an

almost fawning benevolence toward China to one of thorough dis enchantment .

You were spared the fierce hostilities which rent

this nation internally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and
security regarding China gave way to

feeli~gs

of revQlsion,

hatred, and insecurity .
Your Chinese counterparts, the young people of
today's China- - they are called the "Heirs of the Revolution" - have a similar gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific .
Your generation in China , too , has been contained and isolated,
and its view of the United States has been colored with the hates
of another time .

It has had no contact with you or, indeed, with

much of the world outside China .

On the other hand, those young people have grown
up under easier conditions than the older generation of Chinese
who lived their youth in years of continuous war and revolution.
It may be that they can face you and the rest of the world with
greater equanamity and assurance than has been the case at any
time in modern Chinese history .
I urge you to think for yourselves about China .
I urge you to approach, with a new objectivity, that vast nation,
with its great population of industrious and intelligent people.
Bear in mind that the peace of Asia and the world will depend on
China as much as it does on this nation, the Soviet Union, or any
other, not because China is Communist but because China is China-among the largest countries in the world and the most populous.
Mao Tse-Tung remarked in an interview several years
ago that "future events would be decided byfuture generations."
Insofar as his words involve the relationshi p of this nat ion and
China, whether they prove to be a prophecy of doom or a f o recast
of a happier future will depend not so much on us, the ''Old China
Hands 11 of yesterday, but on you, the ''New American Hands 11 of
tomorrow .

